Interview with Henry Heneghan by Allen, William F.
Interview with Henry Heneghan. 
This is the 8th of August, 1986 and I'm talking with Henry 
Heneghan who is currently Vice President for Business and Finance 
but who has been here for how long, Hank? 
Hank: Going on 25 years. 
Allen: Going on 25 years. You first came as a faculty member in 
the College of Engineering? 
Hank: Yes, in 1962. 
Allen: And what did you teach there? 
Hank: Electrical Engineering. 
Allen: And then, when we moved into computers, you went over as 
Director of the Computer Center. 
Hank: Right. I don;t remember the exact date but it was around 
'67, '68 in there somewhere. 
Allen: And how did you get into that move? 
Hank: By making a mistake at missing a meeting. 
Allen: How was that? 
Hank: Henry Littlefield had formed a committee to look at put-
ting in some computers. Al Diem had a computer in the, that came 
under him as being used for the records, registrar records and 
some of the business. The academic people wanted some computers 
and Harold see was pushing it, and it was a little bit, I guess, 
disagreement going on as to what they should have and who should 
have what, so Henry set up a committee. And I got put on the 
committee because I was a faculty member in Engineering and I was 
teaching a course, teaching computer programing on the Engineer-
ing computer, and so they decided to have a study. I headed up 
the study. I got the job of trying to analyze what everyone 
needed and interviewing vendors to get specifications on 
computers. And that was fine, that was all I was going to do. I 
was going to do that for about a year. At the end of the year, 
they decided they were going to buy computers, then they needed 
someone to run it, and again there were sort of a feud that, I 
think, between Diem and Harold as to whether it should, who 
should control. Should it be under Academic control or Business 
control? 
There was a committee meeting and I didn't go to it, for some 
reason I missed it, and I was told afterwards, that, you know, if 
I wanted it, I could be the head of the computer center. so I 
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gather Harold had won the battle, but I ended up working for 
Diem. That may have been the compromise. Take an academic 
person, put him in charge of computers and report to the Business 
off ice. 
Allen: This was the IBM computer? 
Hank: At that time we had the IBM, 360-20 and we had the IBM 
1620 over in the Tech. Building. That was about it. we put in, 
at this time, we brought in th NCR. That was, again that was an 
experiment. we had looked at the computers, frankly I had recom-
mended going with the IBM. NCR came out with a new computer. 
The, I guess it was city Trust, do you remember Nelson North? 
North used to be with City Trust and I guess he was pretty 
friendly with Henry. City Trust decided they were going with the 
new NCR computers. He talked to Henry, I guess, and his people 
had given him the feedback that it was a good deal and why didn't 
we take a look at it? And I guess they may have been friendly 
with the local NCR people, I think that guy, I don't remember his 
name, but he was quite friendly with that group, so we made a 
trip to Dayton. Newman Marsilius, Henry, myself and I think 
Nelson, I think North went along, and some NCR people went out 
there and we spent a couple of days. They showed us everything 
and they were willing to come in with pretty good financial deal 
for us, and made some commitments that no other vendor was will-
ing to make so we ended up going with, we stayed with them for 
about 5 years or so and then went to (?) 
Allen: Now the computer at this time was split up how, between 
Business and Academic? 
Hank: Well, it really wasn't split. At that time, we did 
everything. Any business applications, any academic applications 
were done in the Computer Center. There was really no specifica-
tions set down that we were going to be, you know, we were only 
going to put in 50% of our time on each. I think from right off, 
we were probably spending more time on the business applications 
than we were on the academic applications, only because there 
were more people looking for this, you know the records, people 
went on the machine, the business off ice went on the machine, 
different ones went on, and there weren't a lot of academic ap-
plications initially. It started to build up, and didn't make a 
lot of difference, the machine was big enough. We had excess 
capacity at that time. we were actually, for a while selling 
time outside. We sold to Sacred Heart, we sold to the Hydraulic 
Company, a few other organizations, tried to keep it non-profit, 
but we would sell the service. we didn't even keep track of who, 
how much was being used, where. 
Allen: Now what was the business application like at this time? 
Hank: What do you mean by like? 
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Allen: What was on it,what did you do with it? 
Hank: It was all batch processing, which meant everything was 
really prepared by hand, brought over, key punched, a whole lot 
of cards were read in, and that's the way all operations went. 
The registration was on it, the records, not the permanent record 
card, only the semester records were on it. The schedule was put 
on, building the schedules, the computer was used for that, and 
then in the business area was payroll, accounts payable, receiv-
ables and the general ledger. They were the only things that 
were on the computer. 
Then as time went on, we started throwing in a lot of other 
things, we threw in more stuff for the registrar, we started 
throwing in a lot of reporting for what you would call institu-
tional research. we started putting the grades, sort of, we were 
taking the stuff from the registrar and using it, and when the 
grades came in, put the grades up on it, and produce the grade 
reports. And we started doing test scoring. You first went on 
it. And doing the automatic, multiple choice, mark sensing, test 
scoring. we ran them through a machine that we had and then 
punched up a card and did the analysis and the grades. 
Allen: That analysis was tremendous for reteaching. 
Hank: Well I guess, you were handling most of it, but it was 
really for the whole freshman history program. It was being 
useful. 
Allen: I put my grad.es on there too, which meant all of the 
bunny work of adding and dividing and so forth, was done and then 
I could spend time on evaluation. 
Hank: Isaacs got involved at that time, very early. He started 
looking into the use of the computer for computer aided 
instruction, so he started back in the late 60's. He's still at 
it, but he started on the NCR at that time. 
Allen: This took us up to the digital which came in about when? 
was that under Manning? 
Hank: No, I guess we brought the digital, it had to be around, 
maybe 73, we brought the digital. I think it came in, we made 
the decision just about the time that Lee and Harry Rowell came. 
The decision was made just before that or just after, but it was 
going on when, I know, because Harry got involved. 
Allen: O.K. and then under the old, you're still using the old 
NCR at that point when the System 6 came in. What was the System 
6. The Esso funded thing under Manning. 
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Hank: I don't know of any System 6. Never heard of it. 
Allen: Really? well this is suppose to be an Exxon funded study 
with a group out of Canada, that Manning was very much interested 
in, that was supposed to deal with institutional reporting. 
Hank: O.K., that was a, that wasn't computer hardware. 
Allen: No, software. 
Hank: That was a software package that was called Campus and we 
were introduced to it by Manning. This was, this came about ac-
tually even before (?) It was before the digital. We ran it on 
the NCR. we started it on the NCR anyway. Its main purpose was 
to look at loads, taking student registration, see how that 
loaded up courses, then from that, o. k., what the department 
loads were, and then fed the budget information in. You could 
either use budget information or you could use the actual 
expenditures, and then it would take all of the financial infor-
mation and allocate it out to the colleges, to the departments 
and right down to each course, and then tell you what it was 
costing to teach each SCH, and so on. It was a cost analysis 
type of system, based on a lot of assumptions. 
Allen: was it any good? 
assumptions. 
when you say based on a lot of 
Hank: Yes, it's as good as the assumptions, you have to make a 
lot of assumptions, but any cost allocating system, you have to. 
For example, how are you going to divide the library, the cost of 
the library out to the colleges? And then how are you going to 
distribute it out to the various courses? You've got to make 
some arbitrary decision as to, o.k. its going to be done, we'll 
just take the total number of SCH's and divide it into the cost 
and spread it that way. Once you do that, you may not be getting 
a fair look at some departments. It might be better to go in and 
actually let the library people tell you, o.k. this year we spent 
this much for engineering and, you know, this much for (?) The 
only problem with that is, every year you got a new set of 
assumptions, a new formula, and then you don't have a comparison, 
but the old way by SCH, or by head count or something, 
distribution, may not be the fairest either. And you had all of 
those (?). The library is just one, but how do you charge out 
computer services. It would be no different if you were doing it 
by hand. So the model, all they did was take a model that some 
schools had used, and in particular the public school system and 
put it on the computer. That particular campus model was prob-
ably more applicable to a public institution than a private 
institution. And worked better in a school that was all (?) one 
tuition, everybody paid the same. You get into some problems 
when you' re working with part timers, everything was done on a 
FTE basis. so then you had to start budgeting to get the part 
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timers in as percentages of FTE, but it was o.k., we used it. 
We used it, well we ran things off and looked at programs and 
made some comparisons between some programs. It was helpful but 
it was not a good decision, You couldn't use it to make your 
decisions. You could use some of the information to help you 
make a decision, but if you ever just left it to the report and 
said o. k. take the least profitable one and those are the ones 
that should go, or the one that doesn't, you know, it's not 
making enough revenue to cover its cost, should go, you really 
could not use it or you should not use it. 
Allen: What do we use now? 
Hank: Ed Eigel. And you're passed '73. 
Allen: Now we're just using this for comparison. 
Hank: Frankly, right now we don't use the computer model at all 
for this. we use a technique similar to that, but concentrating 
primarily on the direct cost and not worrying about the 
overheads. This is because of the contract. Program evaluation 
now by the contract with the program evaluation committee and 
they set up their own way of analyzing the programs. They have 
gotten in probably more academic considerations than just 
strictly financial considerations. See, the other thing was that 
the model would never look at anything academic and then Ed 
Eigel, and in Ed's office supplies most of the analysis now, 
toward the cost and it is done pretty much on direct. In other 
words, what's the cost of the faculty and what's the departmental 
budget look like, and they don't worry spreading the 
overhead. 
Allen: O.K. You remember in the late 60's when we had problems 
on the campus, student unrest and so forth. What do you recall 
of that period? 
Hank: Yes, I remember. I don't remember all of that junk. 
Allen: Do you remember when they took over the computer center? 
Hank: Yes, that was, '69 or '70, around in there. The students 
took over the computer center and it was a fun week or so. 
Allen: Any damage done? 
Hank: No. The funny thing about that was, they were pretty 
organized. The kids that came into the computer center and in 
particular the two or three that were the leaders, were veterans. 
They were older but they knew what they were doing, and they had 
things pretty well under control. They had a lot of young kids, 
young girls came in and they had their sit down, but they were 
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just doing what the hell they were told. Kids were smart enough 
that I don't think they had any intention of doing any damage. 
And especially to the computer. They, I'm sure felt that if they 
got into that, that was an expensive item and all hell was going 
to break loose, plus they didn't know very much about it. They 
came in, I know when they took it over, that of course we had had 
word that they were coming, so there was a security officer in 
there. I'm not sure, but I think it was Ron Winkler, and he was 
just starting on the job. I think he couldn't have been here a 
couple of weeks and he was a little apprehensive, but the kids 
came in and they said they were taking over the computer center, 
and the decision had been made not to appose them. we simply 
said ok. I said I'm going over and turn everything off, and one 
of the kids said, he made the threat, he said, well that's o.k., 
we can start it up again, and we're going to ruin all your tapes 
anyway. Then I relaxed because we didn't have any tapes, but he 
looked it over and he couldn't tell we didn't have tapes so I 
figured he didn't know what the hell he was looking for. 
It was, we not only turned it off, but we locked out the power 
and everything else. They couldn't have done anything and they 
never tried. It turned out to be an interesting three days. we 
stayed down in the offices all the time, we walked in and out of 
the computer center when we wanted. Got time to run the 
payroll,had to make a payroll. we went down and talked to them 
and said, look, you're looking for sympathy, but if we don't run 
this payroll, you're not going to get any sympathy from anyone on 
this campus, so they moved out, and we ran the payroll, we 
wouldn't even let them in the room, we said you got to go 
outside. So we were in there and we had a couple of security 
guards with us., We could have kept them out, but we ran the 
payroll, turned everything back off, walked out and let them back 
in. They were happy, that was the only critical job we had to do 
during that time period. 
Allen: Then, about this time, of course, was the Lovell 
resolution. 
Hank: Oh yes, dean of education. The only one I got involved 
with, I don't remember everyone that was in this. I know I got a 
call from Dave Field asking, I knew Dave, and he knew what my 
feelings were, and I went up to his house on a Sunday evening. I 
don't know who else was there. I know Dave was there, you were 
there, from the Math Dept., Louise Turner was there. I know that 
there were some others following. Phys. Ed Dept. but I don't know 
who the hell they were. We talked about it, and I think we 
decided that we developed a little strategy, we were going to 
have another meeting. I think the next meeting we had was in my 
office down in the computer center. we decided to use the com-
puter center to operate out of, and I think the next one we got 
van der Kroef at. Van der Kroef came in and he decided that he 
was going to participate, but at a low level. we laid out the 
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strategy for the new proposal, and then, oh yes, Lou Mullings was 
involved. I remember Lou and I got the job of going to talk to 
Henry. 
Allen: I did too. 
Hank: was there the three of us? 
Allen: I was thinking I went alone. This was with a request for 
a faculty meeting. 
Hank: cause I know we were there, o.k. here's the, we had the 
signatures, we wanted a faculty meeting, what the purpose was, 
and we didn't expect that he had to play any role. All he had to 
do was open the meeting. 
Allen: And recognize me. 
Hank: Recognize you. After that we had the agenda laid out, we 
would pass it around, yield the floor, and do this and that, and 
it actually came off that way. And it wasn't much opposition. 
Allen: In part because we found the opposition so completely 
disorganized, they didn't know how the hell to handle it. And 
Henry was beaming when we came in and told him what we were going 
to do. 
Hank, oh yes, he liked it even better because he didn't have to 
get involved. Who the hell, else, I guess we had a trustee, Herb 
Cohen was involved in that. He wasn't involved with the, no, he 
was involved when the students were taking over the campus. He 
was sort of, couldn't tell whose side he was on. 
Allen: O.K. When Manning came, and within two years, it sud-
denly became knowledgeable that among certain people that we were 
in severe financial problems. If you read the balance sheets 
which were given to the Board at that time, you don't readily see 
this. How did they discover this? 
Hank: To tell you the truth, I don't know. I've never looked at 
those balance sheets and I couldn't tell you whether you could 
discover it, I had a feeling you could. I don't recall any time 
where you ever heard anything from the auditors or anything that 
something was hit. However, balance sheets for a non profit in-
stitution are difficult to read, and to get a feel for what, you 
know, the bottom line. Even now, we still use the same format. 
Multiple fund account, and the business men we have on our Board 
now have trouble. There are a few of them who have been around 
long enough that they adjusted to the multiple fund and they 
translate it into their own way of thinking, so even the balance 
sheets at that time would have been, board members could have 
looked at it, other people could have looked at it. Unless you 
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were an auditor or an accountant, it gets pretty hard to figure 
things out. You can see this fund is in deficit, this one is in 
good shape, and how serious that makes things, you don't know. 
But I think, I don't know who actually discovered it, but I know 
DiLeo, Bob Jeffries, I don't remember who else, got involved. I 
think DiLeo detected a lot because he had the knowledge. He 
could look at the financial statements and know that there was a 
problem. I knew there was a problem, in the computer center. I 
never saw the balance sheets. But we were running the general 
ledger, that was the basis and I could tell, for Christ's sakes, 
nothing balances. we were looking for the cross checks, in other 
words, whenever you run anything off you want a check number, (?) 
you want to say, Hey, this report balance should be this, this 
report balance should be this, and you look at it and if you're 
close, say, 10 million dollars and you' re 9 million and nine 
hundred and ninety eight, you let it go, but if you came in at 5 
million, you say, hey, we got something wrong, we'd better check 
the programs, better check the data and stuff. But we were get-
ting imbalances that were absolutely ridiculous, and when I asked 
the accounting office for check numbers, we weren't getting them. 
They said, don't worry about it we'll fake it. Then, not even 
being an accountant, I said o. k., these things have got to be 
right and we've got a lot of negative balances. 
Allen: About when was this? That you discovered this? 
Hank: This was back probably in 71-72. It started very 
Allen: Just about the time that Manning got here? 
Hank: Yes, I wish to heJ.l this wasn't being recorded, Bill. 
(machine turned off) • I thought Manning walked into a problem, 
I'm not so sure he was the cause of the problem. The financial 
difficulties, I think, started before he got here. I guess his 
problem was, he didn't get at solving them. This is what I 
gather. He, I think the Board felt he was spending too much time 
trying to model it, and play games with it, instead of getting 
and saying, o.k., let's starting cutting back on this, let's 
starting doing this. He wasn't looking at the, for a solution, 
at least in the time that I knew him. He could analyze very 
well. He did some good analysis, I thought. But he didn't seem 
to be able to say, here's the solution, let's cut back here, 
let's do this and then follow through with it. I always thought 
he left too much to, if he said something should be done, he just 
assumed it was going to be done, and that wasn't happening. 
Anyway, its a case of meeting, getting into a situation where you 
really needed real, hard nosed type, management and that was not 
Manning's style. And, frankly, they brought him in here, I have 
to assume that a lot of the people on the Board didn't know that 
they needed a hard nosed man. 
Allen: what do you think caused our financial problem? 
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Hank: I don't know for sure, I've never taken the time to go 
back and analyze all the financials and try to pin it down. If I 
had to make a guess, I think we probably just grew too fast. And 
tried to expand too fast. Got into the growth period of the 
60's. Should have started slowing that down a little bit in the, 
maybe well, around the type that the student unrest started, what 
'68-'69-'70. The brakes probably should have started to be put 
on, however, we stayed with the growth trend. Not only us, a lot 
of schools. 
Allen: we were still buying property, practically at every board 
meeting, they were buying a new piece of property. We were 
building new dorms. we built the Arts and Humanities Center, we 
built the library. 
Hank: And it came at a time when a decision had been made for 
some reason not to do those things. we might have been in better 
financial shape. They hurt, cause it does look like they got in 
and had to use funds, had to go out and borrow to do it and got 
into a lot of things. 
Allen: The first real deficits, however, came under Manning. 
Hank: That's when they started to show up. 
Allen: Prior to that time, the balance may be only a $1,000. at 
the end of the year, a positive balance, but the last year of 
Henry's administration, a very small surplus. 
Hank: see, again you have to .. look, L'.d have to .take a look at 
the bottom lines, and see what kind of transfers were going on. 
O.k. you balance a current operating by borrowing from plant 
funds. There were a lot of ways to do it, so, I don't really 
know, or you could, maybe they were taking too much out of 
operations to pay for some of the plant expansion. 
Allen: There was an awful lot of this, for example, one of the 
plans of financing this building was to pay the debt service by 
income from fines, oh, primarily income from annual giving. 
Hank: That's a lot. 
Allen: That's over $500,000. 
Hank: And they didn't have that much annual giving at that time. 
Allen: And that was based on a guess. 
Al Diem. What kind of a man was he, what was he like? How good 
was he? 
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Hank: No comment. I worked for him at the computer center, 
that's it. we did not, I think because of the situation, I was 
academic. If I talked to Diem two or three times a year, we just 
didn't have any business. I knew what he wanted, you know, he 
wanted the accounting stuff put on, I worked with Gordon Hubbard 
on that. we wanted the payroll on, anything other than that, I 
never got involved with. 
Allen: You mentioned Frank DiLeo, and that Frank DiLeo probably 
knew. Frank headed a committee on the part of the Senate and 
made a report to the committee, to the Senate, which, had it been 
followed, would have saved us an awful lot of grief. 
Hank: Now this is why I say, he had to be looking at the same 
information that other people were looking because of Frank's 
accounting background, he analyzed that, even Manning analyzed 
it. When Harry Rowell came in, it didn't take Harry, I mean he 
looked at the same financial statements, and it didn't take him 
very long to understand bey, we got problems. 
Allen: I know every day I would see him and he'd say, well every 
day a new horror. 
Hank: But you had to look for it. And you had to be looking for 
it. In a lot of cases, they didn't want to look for it. 
Allen: Let me ask you another question in this area. I taped 
Harold see a while back, and Harold made a rather interesting al-
legation and I would like your comments. He said he was talking 
one time with Earle Bigsbee, and said, you know I feel sorry for 
you, he says, these new deans ar:e getting big salaries and you 
are getting a relatively small salary. He said, why isn't this 
evening out? He said Earle told him, don't worry about me, he 
said, I get bonuses at the end of the year along with Henry. And 
he said he checked it out. He said you can check it out but he 
wouldn't tell me how and I don't how the hell to check this out. 
Hank: I don't know how to check it out either. 
Allen: In effect, Harold was saying that Henry and Earle were 
dividing up a large part of the surplus each year. 
Hank: Well, something like that, the auditors would require an 
action of the Board authorizing it, and the auditors would have 
to be involved in it. It's kind of hard to believe. It would 
have to go through, it had to get through the accounting system 
somehow and I would say it would have had to gone through 
payroll. 
Allen: Eileen says there is nothing of that sort. 
Hank: The only other thing is just to issue a check, but it 
10 
would have to be issued in their name. 
pick up that. 
And the auditors would 
Allen: And there is nothing in the auditors report that I have 
seen and there is nothing in the board minutes. However, there 
are a lot of executive sessions of the Board for which there are 
no minutes. For example the setting of the administrators and 
dean's salaries were done in executive session, and there no 
minutes and no record with the trustee minutes, so I don't know. 
Hank: Harold wasn't always, Harold could make statements that 
weren't always based on fact. Harold may have thought that way. 
I don't know where the heck you could go look. That must be back 
in '69. 
Allen: Well, Harold got into the self study and institutional 
research. 
Hank: I'll tell you something. I never bothered looking at what 
the hell people make, but I always saw it even when I was in the 
computer center, because I knew what people were making cause I 
saw the listing. I don't ever remember anyone getting out of 
line. Nothing ever struck me. I don't ever remember seeing a 
payroll list for deans and just of saying to myself, Jesus, why 
the hell is this guy so far out from the rest. Being so far un-
der or over. 
Allen: I had a couple of other questions but they've slipped my 
mind at the present time. I think I will close this off and then 
there are general location type of questions I want to ask you 
which I don't need on the tape. 
(End of tape.} 
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